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NAACP v. AcuSport 
A CALL FOR CHANGE TO PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW* 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a drop over the past decade in the number of 
violent crimes committed with handguns, the United States 
has seen a simultaneous increase in the number of civil suits 
brought against the handgun industry.1 Both public and private 
plaintiffs seek to hold the industry accountable for the crimes 
that continue to be committed with handguns. Various theories 
of liability have been articulated in these cases. One of the 
most prevalent of these theories is that handgun 
manufacturers and distributors have created a public nuisance 
through the negligent marketing and distribution of their 
products.2 On the whole, such litigation has been unsuccessful, 
but some progress has been made in recent years. Courts 
appear more receptive to arguments that negligent marketing 
and distribution practices are foreseeable causes of handgun-
related crimes.3 In the context of public nuisance cases, 
  
 * © 2005 Megan O’Keefe. All Right Reserved 
 1 Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1353, 
1356 (1999) (referencing 30 municipalities that had brought suits against handgun 
manufacturers as of 2000 and identifying several private plaintiffs who filed similar 
suits). 
 2 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), 
although unsuccessful, was one of the first cases brought by a municipality against 
handgun manufacturers under a theory of public nuisance. See also Camden County 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001). In addition to public 
nuisance claims, many private individuals have brought claims of negligent marketing 
against handgun manufacturers. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).  
 3 See infra Parts III & IV. 
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however, such advances have been cut short by the courts’ 
retention and strict application of the special injury rule.     
Public nuisance claims can be brought by both private 
plaintiffs, such as individual citizens or private organizations, 
or by public plaintiffs, such as states or municipalities.4 When a 
private plaintiff brings a public nuisance claim, however, he 
has the added burden of proving that the injury he suffered 
was a special injury. A special injury is one different in kind 
from that suffered by other members of a plaintiff’s community 
who came or could have come into contact with the alleged 
nuisance.5 This requirement has proven to be a difficult hurdle 
for many private plaintiffs to overcome. Application of the 
special injury rule regularly leads to quick victories for 
defendants allegedly or actually maintaining public nuisances.6   
A recent trilogy of cases brought in New York’s state 
and federal courts against the handgun industry illustrates 
both the roads that have been paved toward a victory against 
the handgun industry and the harmful impact that the special 
injury rule has had on this progress. The disappointing 
outcome of the most notable of these cases, NAACP v. 
AcuSport,7 is a model of public nuisance law gone awry.   
In July 2003, in the Eastern District of New York, 
District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein dismissed NAACP v. 
AcuSport, a lawsuit brought by a private plaintiff, the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons 
(“NAACP”), against manufacturers, importers, and distributors 
  
 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B(1) (1979). 
 5 Id.  
 6 See Saks v. Petosa, 584 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1992) in which a lessee 
erected a fence that violated the zoning resolution. Private citizens filed a suit claiming 
that the fence constituted a public nuisance. The case was dismissed on appeal. The 
court found the citizens did not have standing to maintain a cause of action alleging 
public nuisance because their damage did not differ from that of the public in general. 
Id. at 322. See also Queens County Business Alliance, Inc. v. New York Racing Assoc., 
469 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 1983), in which the plaintiff, a business alliance 
representing merchants and others, brought suit to enjoin the defendant, a racing 
association, from violating city zoning ordinances. The plaintiff alleged no injury 
different from that suffered by other residents and merchants of the county, and the 
case was thus dismissed. Id. at 449. But see Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated 
Laundries Corp., 180 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div. 1958), in which the plaintiff, an 
apartment house owner, brought a nuisance action against the defendant, a laundry 
company. The defendant parked and stored large trucks and some passenger cars on 
the public sidewalk, substantially blocking the sidewalk with respect to the plaintiff’s 
premises, but not precluding entirely pedestrian traffic. The court affirmed the trial 
court’s injunction because plaintiff succeeded in proving a special injury. Id. at 645-46. 
 7 NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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of handguns.8 The NAACP brought (based) its action on a 
public nuisance theory under New York law. Judge Weinstein’s 
decision to dismiss the case hinged on the NAACP’s failure to 
establish a critical element of the claim – that members or 
potential members of the NAACP suffered a special injury as a 
result of the public nuisance created by the negligent acts of 
handgun manufacturers.9 Ultimately, the NAACP could prove 
that its members suffered harm of a greater degree than that 
suffered by the public at large.10 However, this distinction failed 
to satisfy the special injury rule, which requires the harm to be 
different in kind.11   
The AcuSport decision reveals the substantial 
shortcomings that the special injury rule imposes on public 
nuisance laws. Public nuisance laws were developed to protect 
public rights and values,12 and most Americans value a society 
that places some responsibility on the gun industry for the high 
rates of crime and violence associated with its products.13 
Legislatures, influenced by the powerful lobbies of the gun 
industry and the National Rifle Association, may have failed to 
pass certain measures for reducing gun violence that a 
majority of the public would support,14 but this failure need not 
leave Americans without remedies. Because public nuisance 
laws derive from the common law, courts have a unique 
opportunity to use these laws to articulate a level of 
responsibility and accountability expected of handgun 
manufacturers. However, by retaining the special injury rule, 
courts cannot effectively vindicate the rights and values of 
  
 8 Id. at 446.   
 9 Id.  
 10 See infra Part IV.A. 
 11 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 451.   
 12 See infra Part II.A. 
 13 See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2001) (“Nationwide surveys 
conducted in 1996 and 1998 revealed majority support for laws that would restrict 
qualified purchasers to one gun per month and that would compel manufacturers to 
install locking devices in all new handguns; both measures were successfully opposed 
in Congress by the industry and the NRA.”).  
 14 Id. Polls have consistently recorded a public preference for stricter gun 
control laws. “Six in ten Americans believe that laws covering the sale of firearms 
should be more stringent than they are now.” Keating Holland, Poll: Majority of 
Americans Favor Stricter Gun Control, CNN, (Apr. 12, 2000) at http://www.cnn.com 
/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/04/12/poll.guns/index.html (last visited April 20, 2005). 
Seventy-two percent of Americans favor stricter laws relating to the control of 
handguns. See Humphrey Taylor, The Gun Control Enigma, Harris Interactive (May 
13, 2000), at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=89 (last 
visited April 20, 2005).  
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American society. The special injury rule prevents courts from 
capitalizing on the full potential of public nuisance laws. 
Although English common law courts originally conceived of 
the special injury rule as an element of the tort of public 
nuisance, today, that very element often precludes the tort 
from serving the needs that its originators intended it to serve -
- protecting the public by abating public nuisances.        
Courts articulate many reasons for maintaining the 
special injury rule, the most common of which is a fear that 
abandonment of the rule would open a floodgate of trivial 
litigation. While this argument does have merit in the context 
of private plaintiffs seeking damages, it seems misplaced in the 
context of private plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. This Note 
argues that public nuisance laws could best protect public 
rights and values if states like New York eliminate the special 
injury rule for private plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief. This 
change would allow more private citizens to abate public 
nuisances without threatening courts with excessive litigation 
or undermining the public rights and values that public 
nuisance laws were designed to protect.  
Part I of this Note will examine the current problem of 
gun violence in the United States and review the recent history 
of handgun litigation. Part II will explore the history and 
development of public nuisance laws. Parts III and IV will 
examine how recent New York litigation, specifically AcuSport, 
highlights the inadequacies of current public nuisance laws. 
Finally, Part V will argue that the history of the special injury 
rule, recent changes to the rule in other jurisdictions, and 
existing procedural protections against excessive litigation all 
point to the misplacement of the special injury rule in private 
actions for injunctive relief.    
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF HANDGUN VIOLENCE AND 
HANDGUN LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Over the past decade, the United States has witnessed a 
steady decline in and stabilization of the number of violent 
crimes committed with firearms. This number peaked at 
581,697 in 1993.15 Over 17,000 of those crimes were homicides.16 
  
 15 Crimes Committed with Firearms, 1973-2002, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/guncrimetab.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2004). 
 16 Id. 
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By 2001, the number of violent crimes committed with firearms 
dropped significantly to 354,754.17 Of those crimes, over 11,000 
were homicides.18 This decrease followed the enactment of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in November 1993.19 
The federal act established a system of background checks on 
the eligibility of applicants to buy or otherwise acquire 
handguns or rifles.20 Between March 1, 1994, and December 30, 
2001, almost 38 million applications for firearms were made to 
federally licensed dealers. Roughly two percent of those 
applicants, approximately 840,000, were rejected.21 Despite the 
positive effects of the Brady Act, the number of gun-related 
deaths suffered each year in the United States remains higher 
than that of any other civilized nation.22   
The impact of handgun violence on the African-
American community has been particularly acute, and 
undoubtedly led the NAACP to file its lawsuit against the 
handgun industry. For example, in 1999, 505 murders were 
committed with firearms in New York State, and 466 of those 
murders were committed with handguns.23 Of the 466 victims 
killed by handguns in New York State in 1999, 296 were 
black.24 This number is highly disproportionate given the fact 
that of the approximately 19 million people living in New York, 
only three million are black.25 Thus, while blacks make up only 
15 % of New York State’s population, they represent 63.5 % of 
the victims of handgun homicides. This significant impact that 
gun-related crimes have on the black population indicates the 
limited ability that our current legislation has to effectively 
address our country’s handgun problem.   
  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922, 924, 925A; 42 U.S.C. § 3759) 
(2000)).  
 20 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).  
 21 Michael Bowling, et al., Background Checks for Firearms Transfers, 2001, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (Sep. 19, 2002),  at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
bcft01.pdf (last visited April 20, 2005).  
 22 E.G. Krug, et al., Firearm-Related Deaths in the United States and 35 
Other High- and Upper-Middle-Income Countries, 27 INT’L. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 217 
(Issue 2, 1998).  
 23 1999 Crime & Justice Annual Report, §1 Crimes Reported 21, tbl. 11, New 
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, available at http://criminaljustice. 
state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja_99/sect1a.pdf (1999).  
 24 Id. 
 25 United States Census 2000 Demographic Profiles, United States Bureau of 
the Census available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/NY/04036.pdf. (2000). 
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Clearly, for the United States to adequately address the 
problem of gun violence, the government must not regulate 
only handgun buyers.26 American citizens, as well as states and 
municipalities have begun to look at litigation as an 
opportunity to pick up the fight against handgun violence 
where legislation leaves off. Initially, plaintiffs saw little 
success.27 The handgun industry has traditionally responded to 
litigation brought against it with a foreseeability argument.28 
Manufacturers and distributors maintain that they should not 
be held accountable for crimes committed by third parties with 
handguns because they could not foresee the number of 
handguns involved in criminal acts.29 Settlements are rare.30 
Most manufacturers have chosen – with much success – to 
litigate the cases brought against them.31 And as most courts 
have given the industry’s foreseeability argument weight,32most 
cases have ended on defendant-manufacturers’ motions to 
dismiss or motions for summary judgment.33   
  
 26 See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1993). 
 27 Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA’s 
Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 651 n.9 (2003). 
 28 Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-
Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the 
Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 23 (2000) (arguing that courts reject negligence 
claims brought against plaintiffs because they cannot satisfy the foreseeability element 
of the tort).  
 29 Daniel L. Feldman, Not Quite High Noon for Gunmakers, But It’s Coming: 
Why Hamilton Still Means Negligence Liability in Their Future, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 293, 
301 (2001). A plaintiff alleging a public nuisance must prove causation, but many 
handguns used in criminal acts are not purchased but rather are stolen from the 
current stock of guns in American homes—approximately 200 million. Id. 
 30 See Lytton, supra note 13, at 1260 (“Rather than settling most 
manufacturers have gambled that they could defeat plaintiffs in court . . . .”).  
 31 Id.  
 32 Feldman, supra note 29, at 293 (“With very few exceptions, American 
courts have not endorsed mass tort claims against handgun manufacturers. Questions 
of cause-in-fact and whether third parties have a duty of care to strangers have posed 
significant obstacles.”). 
 33 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 426 
(3d Cir. 2002).  
The causal connection between the gun manufacturers’ conduct and the 
plaintiffs’ injuries is attenuated and weak. Further, if we allowed this action, 
it would be difficult to apportion damages to avoid multiple recoveries and 
the district court would be faced with apportioning liability among, at 
minimum, the various gun manufacturers, the distributors, the dealers, the 
resellers, and the shooter.  
Id; Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against gun manufacturer was appropriate because 
plaintiff did not allege that the act of manufacturing a gun was abnormally dangerous 
but rather that the use of the completed product by others was unusually dangerous); 
see also Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, Firearms Litigation Reporter: Updates in 
Municipal Litigation, at http://www.firearmslitigation.org (last visited Dec. 26, 2003) 
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New data on the handgun industry has weakened the 
industry’s defense. Recent studies have revealed that more 
criminals buy their guns new than steal them.34 Firearm 
trafficking investigations performed between July 1996 and 
December 1998 on guns recovered from criminals revealed that 
although over 11,000 of the guns traced were stolen from 
licensed gun dealers, over 40,000 guns were trafficked by 
licensed dealers.35 This illegal market creates opportunities for 
individuals to engage in crimes and violent acts that may 
otherwise not be committed. Despite any help these statistics 
offer to plaintiffs attempting to overcome the handgun 
industry’s foreseeability arguments, the industry continues to 
prevail against these private plaintiffs bringing public nuisance 
claims because many fail to prove another necessary element of 
the claim: the special injury.36 Without further regulations 
coming from legislators, public nuisance laws can offer an 
immediate and effective remedy to those citizens who suffer the 
violent repercussions of negligent manufacturing and 
distribution of handguns.37 Eliminating the special injury rule 
for plaintiffs seeking injunctions could reinvigorate the remedy 
that public nuisance laws provide, enabling them to effectively 
serve as a weapon in the United States’ ongoing battle against 
handgun violence.   
  
(identifying nine lawsuits brought by municipalities against handgun manufacturers 
that were dismissed including Chicago, Cincinnati, Gary, and New Orleans). 
 34 Feldman, supra note 29, at 301 (citing Glenn L. Pierce, et al., National 
Report on Firearm Trace Analysis for 1996-1997, at 11, tbl. 5 (1998)). 
 35 Id. at 301-02 (citing BATF US Dept. of Treasury, Following the Gun: 
Enforcing Federal Law Against Firearms Traffickers, at 13, tbl. 3 (2000)). See also Fox 
Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid To Tiny Fraction of Dealers, N.Y. TIMES, Jul 
1, 1999, at A14 (“Until recently, it had been widely believed that for the most part, 
criminals and juvenile offenders stole their guns, and that with 230 million guns in 
America, there was little that law enforcement could do to stanch the flow to them.”).  
 36 See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.  
 37 Daniel P. Larsen, Combating the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of Tort 
Liability, 5 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 21, 38-39 (1995) (“Th[e] adaptability of public 
nuisance law to many types of situations enables the law to be much less rigid than 
statutory regulations. Unlike public nuisance law regulatory statutes are limited in 
their ability to adjust to changed conditions. Change occurs through either 
amendments pursuant to the legislative process or, less radically, through agency or 
judicial interpretations. Therefore, common law public nuisance law provides the 
desired remedy of abatement, without the quagmire of legislation or the obsolescence of 
static regulations. Public nuisance may serve as either a supplement to statutory 
regulations for intentional introductions or as the primary tool for unintentional 
introductions of exotic species, perhaps the most formidable environmental pollutant 
not adequately addressed in the law to date.”). 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC NUISANCE 
The history and development of public nuisance laws 
and the special injury rule illustrate the misplacement of the 
special injury rule as an element of private actions for 
injunctive relief against public nuisances. This section 
discusses the birth of public nuisance law in England and 
examines how the law has since expanded and changed in the 
United States.  
A.  Public Nuisance Under English Common Law 
A public nuisance is an “unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public.”38 Nuisance laws have 
their roots in England where a nuisance, in its earliest form, 
was a tort against land, or more specifically, an interference 
with the use or enjoyment of one’s private land.39 Later, 
nuisance came to encompass “infringement[s] of the rights of 
the Crown,” acts that could only be abated by the king bringing 
a criminal action for nuisance.40 These cases also involved 
interference with land, usually public highways, and they were 
labeled public nuisances.  English courts distinguished the two 
by labeling the original tort, interference with the enjoyment of 
private land, a private nuisance. The owner of the private land 
sought to redress private nuisances, rather than the king.41 
Both public and private nuisances exist today. While the tort of 
private nuisance has remained largely unchanged, public 
nuisance has changed and expanded since its origin.      
Over time, the law of public nuisance has developed in 
several ways. First, the doctrine was expanded to redress not 
just the rights of the Crown, but also the rights of the public.42 
The interferences labeled public nuisances went beyond the 
obstruction of public highways and came to comprise a variety 
of nuisances infringing on public rights such as an 
“interference with a market, smoke from a lime-pit, and 
diversion of water from a mill.”43 Initially, only the king could 
  
 38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
 39 Id. § 822. 
 40 Id. § 821B cmt. a (stating that the remedies for public nuisance originally 
were criminal).  
 41 William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 
997-98 (1966). 
 42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B cmt. a (1979).  
 43 Id. at § 821B cmt. b. See Prosser, supra note 41, at 998-99 (“By degrees the 
class of offenses recognized as ‘common nuisance’ was greatly expanded to include any 
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redress these invasions of public rights.44 However, in the 
sixteenth century, this element of the public nuisance law also 
changed. The second major shift in the traditional public 
nuisance laws was the creation of a private right of action for a 
public nuisance, which allowed private individuals to bring 
claims.  
The first case of a private action for public nuisance was 
brought in England in 1536.45 The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant had blocked a public highway, thereby preventing 
him from reaching his property.46 While the court decided that 
the defendant’s obstruction of the highway did constitute a 
public nuisance, the justices disagreed as to whether the 
plaintiff had any right to recovery.47 Chief Justice Baldwin held 
that the court should follow the established rule that such an 
interference could only be redressed with an action brought by 
the Crown. He feared that allowing one such action to be 
brought by a private individual would open the door to 
hundreds of similar actions.48 Disagreeing with the Chief 
Justice was Justice Fitzherbert, who believed the court should 
make an exception and allow a private plaintiff to bring a suit 
for public nuisance if he “had greater hurt or inconvenience 
than any other man had.”49 Justice Fitzherbert described this 
greater hurt or inconvenience as a “special hurt,”50 known today 
as a special injury.  
  
‘act not warranted by law or an omissions to discharge a legal duty, which 
inconveniences the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty’s 
subjects.’”). 
 44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B cmt. a (1979).  
 45 Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 26, pl. 10 (1536). 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. (“If one person shall have an action for this, by the same reason every 
person shall have an action, and so he will be punished a hundred times on the same 
case.”).  
 49 Id.  
 50 Justice Fitzherbert used the following example to describe the kind of 
“special hurt” that could arise from a public nuisance and give rise to a private action: 
I agree well that each nuisance done in the King’s highway is punishable in the Leet 
and not by an action, unless it be where one man has suffered greater hurt or 
inconvenience that the generality have; but he who has suffered such greater 
displeasure or hurt can have an action to recover the damage which he has by 
reason of this special hurt. So if one makes a ditch across the highway, and I come 
riding along the way in the night and I and my horse are thrown into the ditch so 
that I have great damage and displeasure thereby, I shall have an action here 
against him who made this ditch across the highway, because I have suffered more 
damage than any other person. 
Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 26, pl. 10 (1536). 
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Ultimately, the courts of England adopted Justice 
Fitzherbert’s approach and allowed private plaintiffs to bring 
actions for public nuisance if they could show that they had 
suffered some kind of special hurt.51 Such suits were labeled 
tort cases, as opposed to the criminal cases that could still 
brought by the crown.52 By limiting the number of private 
plaintiffs who can bring a suit for public nuisance, the special 
hurt requirement preserved the original intent of public 
nuisance laws, which were developed primarily to protect the 
public-at-large from harm or danger.53 Allowing all private 
plaintiffs to bring actions for public nuisance, regardless of the 
harm they suffered, would not necessarily protect the public so 
much as redress wrongs to private individuals. The 
implementation of the special injury rule reduced the number 
of private plaintiffs attempting to relieve individual harms not 
shared by the community through public nuisance laws. 
Criminal prosecutions remained available after the 
development of the private action for public nuisance. However, 
by the mid-eighteenth century, public officials increasingly 
sought injunctive relief in the civil courts to avoid time-
consuming criminal actions.54 Not long thereafter, private 
plaintiffs, who initially sought damages to recover from their 
special harms, began seeking injunctive relief when bringing 
their private actions for public nuisance.55 Undoubtedly, the 
  
 51 Initially there was some confusion within the English courts as to what a 
“special hurt” was. This confusion seems to stem from Justice Fitzherbert’s use of the 
phrase “greater hurt or inconvenience.” The disagreement was as to whether the harm 
a private plaintiff suffered had to be different-in-degree or different-in-kind from that 
suffered by the community at large. Eventually courts settled on the different-in-kind 
test for a special injury. However, this decision seems to have been more of a practical 
one as opposed to a conclusion dictated by the doctrinal underpinnings of Justice 
Fitzherbert’s opinion or public nuisance laws in general. A different-in-kind test was 
simply easier for courts to administer than a different-in-degree test. See Prosser, 
supra note 41, at 1008; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (3d ed. 1964).   
 52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1979); Prosser, supra 
note 40, at 999 (1966). See also Christopher V. Panoff, In re the Exxon Valdez Alaska 
Native Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living, and the Special 
Injury Rule, 28 ENVTL. L. 701, 707-08 (1998) (“Eventually, public nuisance began to 
mesh with the concept of tort. The first case to break away from the concept of allowing 
only the king to sue for public nuisance occurred in 1536 . . . . This marked the humble 
beginning of the special injury rule.”).  
 53 NAACP v. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 481-82 (E.D.N.Y 2003).  
 54 See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 799 (2003) (“Initially, injunctive relief was seen as a 
supplement to the criminal prosecution . . . .”). In 1819, in the case of A.G. v. Johnson, 
the Attorney General filed an information for injunctive relief in the King’s Bench to 
abate an illegal wharf in the Thames. The injunction was granted, clearing the way for 
the Attorney General to bring civil proceedings to abate public nuisances. Id. 
 55 1752 appears to be the first year in which private parties began to seek 
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many potential parties involved and the various means by 
which they could abate a public nuisance led to some of the 
confusion that surrounded the tort in its development; and that 
confusion continues today.  
B.  Adoption and Expansion of Public Nuisance Laws in the 
United States  
Public nuisance became part of early American law 
when the United States adopted the English common law.56 As 
with most aspects of the common law, colonial America adopted 
England’s public nuisance law without much change.57 Early 
American courts typically heard two categories of public 
nuisance complaints. The first consisted of obstructions of 
public highways58or navigable waterways.59 The second included 
minor offenses that compromised public morals or the public 
welfare.60 As in England, either private individuals who 
suffered a special injury or criminal prosecutors brought these 
complaints.    
Today, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(“Restatement”) defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”61 For a 
majority of states, public nuisance laws exist in the form of 
criminal statutes that impose various penalties on those who 
create public nuisances or contribute to them. Like the 
Restatement, such laws tend to be broad and vague and do not 
  
injunctive relief to abate public nuisances. In the case of Baines v. Baker, the defendant 
had opened an inoculation hospital where persons who feared catching smallpox could 
go and be infected under promising conditions, thereby inoculating themselves. A 
neighbor of the hospital, a private plaintiff, believed it was a public nuisance and 
sought an injunction. Lord Hardwicke denied the request for injunctive relief stating 
that, because the hospital was a public nuisance, it was the Attorney General’s decision 
as to whether to file an information in the King’s Bench. Id.  
 56 Prosser, supra note 41, at 999. 
 57 Gifford, supra note 54, at 802.  
 58 See, e.g., Thayer v. Dudley, 3 Mass. 296 (1807) (placing logs in the middle 
of a Cambridge highway). 
 59 See, e.g., Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362 (Conn. 1792) (erecting a dam across 
a river that prevented boats from reaching plaintiff’s house, farm, store, and ship-
yard).  
 60 See United States v. Holly, 26 F. Cas. 346 (D.C. Cir. 1829) (No. 15,381) 
(operating gambling house); State v. Kirby, 5 N.C. 254 (1809) (swearing in the court-
yard during the sitting of the jury); Commonwealth v. Harrington, 20 Mass. (3 
Pickering) 26 (1825) (letting out and accommodating a part of a house for the business 
of prostitution).  
 61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). See also, Copart Indus., 
Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that 
emissions from a plant could be a public nuisance but not a private nuisance).  
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offer a clear definition of "nuisance". 62 Nonetheless, these 
statutes do make clear that, as in England, a public nuisance 
involves an act or omission that causes damage by invading a 
public interest or right.63 Some states, such as New York, have 
not codified their public nuisance laws and continue to rely on 
the common law.64 In addition to general prohibitions against 
public nuisances, most states have criminal statutes declaring 
specific acts or omissions to be public nuisances.65   
American courts continue to limit private citizens’ 
access to claims of public nuisance by retaining the special 
injury rule.66 When the American courts first adopted the public 
nuisance doctrine from English common law in the late 1800s, 
they struggled to determine the proper test for special injury.67 
The question was how to measure the “greater hurt or 
inconvenience” that Justice Fitzherbert suggested a private 
plaintiff had to prove to establish a claim. While American 
courts eventually settled on the different-in-kind test, the state 
and federal courts initially split on this issue. State courts 
adopted the different-in-kind test while federal courts preferred 
a different-in-degree test.68 As in England, the American courts, 
  
 62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1979). See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE § 47.42.010 (2003) (“The control of signs in areas adjacent to state highways 
of this state is hereby declared to be necessary to promote the public health, safety, 
welfare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment in 
the interstate system and other state highways, and to attract visitors to this state by 
conserving the natural beauty of areas adjacent to the interstate system . . . .”); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 48-7 (2004) (“Whoever shall knowingly erect, establish, continue, 
maintain, use, own, occupy or lease any building, erection or place used for the purpose 
of lewdness, assignation or prostitution in the Commonwealth is guilty of a nuisance . . 
. .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.090 (2003) (“A person commits the crime of publicly 
displaying nudity or sex for advertising purposes if . . . .”). 
 63 Examples of acts or omissions held to be public nuisances under general 
public nuisance statutes include keeping hogpens, carrying a child with smallpox on a 
public highway, unlicensed prize fights, public profanity, a malarial pond, the storage 
of explosives, gaming houses, or the shooting of fireworks in the street. Prosser, supra 
note 41, at 1000. Conduct that causes or contributes to a public nuisance can fall 
within the three traditional categories of liability: intent, negligence, and strict 
liability. Id. at 1003-04.   
 64 NAACP v. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 454 (E.D.N.Y 2003).  
 65 Examples of acts or omissions deemed by statutes to be public nuisances 
include maintaining bawdy houses, growing black currant plants, allowing narcotics to 
be sold in buildings, failing to attend to mosquito breeding waters, or maintaining 
unhealthy multiple dwellings. Prosser, supra note 41, at 999-1000. 
 66 The special injury rule was officially adopted by the Supreme Court in 
1838 when it held, “[A] plaintiff cannot maintain a stand in court of equity; unless he 
avers and proves some special injury.” Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 
37 U.S. 91, 99 (1838).  
 67 Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of 
the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 805-06 (2001). 
 68 Id.  
 2/25/2005 1:51:29 PM 
2005] NAACP V. ACUSPORT 1091 
both state and federal, eventually settled on the different-in-
kind test, apparently for reasons of judicial efficiency. 
Measuring degrees of harm tends to be more subjective and 
thus more time-consuming than distinguishing kinds of harm. 
What is most frustrating, however, is that no court suggests 
that the strict different-in-kind test is better aligned with the 
doctrinal purpose of public nuisance laws.69 Such an arbitrary 
choice of definition adds credence to an argument for changing 
the special injury rule.70   
C.  The Elements of Common Law Public Nuisance 
Although a state may not codify a specific act as a public 
nuisance,71 one may still bring an action to abate an act if he 
can prove the elements of a public nuisance under the state’s 
general public nuisance statute or under the common law. By 
way of example, New York courts applying public nuisance 
laws aim to deter “conduct or omissions which offend, interfere 
with or cause damage to the public in the exercise of rights 
common to all in a manner such as to offend public morals, 
interfere with use by the public of a public place or endanger or 
injure the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable 
number of persons.”72 To establish a public nuisance under the 
common law in New York, a private plaintiff must prove: (1) 
the existence of a public nuisance; (2) conduct or omissions by a 
defendant that create, contribute to, or maintain that public 
nuisance; and (3) a particular harm suffered by the plaintiff as 
a result of the public nuisance that is different in kind from 
that suffered by the community at large.73 A public plaintiff, on 
  
 69 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (“The requirement that a private plaintiff 
suing for public nuisance demonstrate particular harm different from that suffered by 
the public at large may be criticized on the ground that it inhibits adequate protection 
of the public when government authorities can not or will not act . . . . It does cut down 
potential suits by ‘busybodies’ having no particular interest in abating the nuisance 
except ideology.”). 
 70 Despite any vagueness in the general public nuisance laws, one can easily 
distinguish public nuisance from its counterpart, private nuisance, which was also 
adopted in the United States from the English common law and has not changed much 
since its English origin. A private nuisance threatens one person or a few individuals 
as a result of an interference with the use or enjoyment of private land. This private 
right of action extends to all individuals who suffer such a harm. See Copart, 362 
N.E.2d at 971.  
 71 See supra note 62. 
 72 Copart, 362 N.E.2d at 971. 
 73 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
 2/25/2005 1:51:29 PM 
1092 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:3 
the other hand, must prove the first two elements but need not 
prove the third, a special injury.   
1. Existence of a Public Nuisance 
When bringing a claim for public nuisance, a private 
plaintiff must first prove the existence of a public nuisance. As 
stated, a public nuisance is a substantial interference with a 
public right. The Restatement defines a public right as one 
shared by all members of the general public.74 A nuisance need 
not affect a set number of individuals to render it a public 
nuisance. Rather, a nuisance becomes public when it is 
“committed in such a place and in such manner that the 
aggregation of private injuries becomes so great and extensive 
as to constitute a public annoyance and inconvenience.”75 
Consequently, a plaintiff does not have to show that a nuisance 
affects every member of a community to prove that it is a 
public nuisance. Instead, a plaintiff only needs to show that the 
nuisance will affect every member of a community who comes 
into contact with it while exercising a public right.76 
The Restatement defines the term “substantial 
interference,” as an interference that is unreasonable. The 
Restatement attempts to elaborate upon the meaning of the 
term with the following explanation:  
Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with 
a public right is unreasonable include the following: (a) whether the 
conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, 
the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public 
convenience, or (b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, 
ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the conduct is 
of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting 
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a 
significant effect upon the public right.77 
So long as an interference with a public right is 
reasonable, New York courts will not deem it a public nuisance. 
To determine whether an interference is reasonable, courts 
often look to the necessity, degree, and/or duration of the 
interference. For example, in Hofeler v. Buck, the Supreme 
Court of New York Court held that news stands on sidewalk 
  
 74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979). 
 75 People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 247 (1930). 
 76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1979). 
 77 Id. § 821B. 
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corners constituted a public nuisance unless they fell under the 
exceptions of being either “only temporary; that is, not 
permanent or habitual, or . . . necessary.”78 The defendants 
tried to argue that the news stands were necessary because 
they allowed people to purchase clean, dry newspapers. The 
court dismissed this argument stating that “[t]o take from the 
taxpayer the right to use these sidewalk spaces constructed 
and maintained for travel . . . in order to serve such a 
convenience, is a contention that needs no argument. These 
news stands are not . . . necessary or reasonable, but are 
encroachments or incumbances upon the public street and, 
therefore, nuisances as matter of law.”79 Thus, while an act or 
omission may simultaneously interfere with public rights and 
offer the public some kind of benefit or convenience, courts will 
deem it a nuisance unless they find it reasonable.80  
In addition to the reasonableness of the interference, 
courts will also consider the legality of an act that creates a 
public nuisance. Courts do not, however, recognize legality as a 
defense to an action for public nuisance, and may enjoin a 
defendant from engaging in otherwise legal acts if the manner 
in which the defendant engages in those acts creates or 
contributes to a public nuisance.81 The exception to this rule is 
that conduct fully authorized by statute, ordinance, or 
administrative regulation does not subject the actor to liability 
for a public nuisance even if that conduct creates or contributes 
to a public nuisance.82  
These questions of legality and reasonableness 
frequently arise in handgun litigation brought under public 
nuisance laws. As discussed, the gun industry must comply 
with many statutory and administrative regulations.83 While 
many handgun manufacturers and distributors comply with 
these regulations, this compliance is not, in and of itself, a 
defense to a public nuisance claim. Notably, in AcuSport, Judge 
Weinstein observed that the particular marketing and 
  
 78 Hofeler v. Buck, 180 N.Y.S. 563, 566 (Sup. Ct. 1920). 
 79 Id. at 567.  
 80 Robert v. Powell, 61 N.E. 699 (N.Y. 1901) (holding that a stepping stone in 
front of a house on which plaintiff injured himself was not a public nuisance because 
the stepping stone was not an unlawful or dangerous obstruction but a reasonable and 
necessary use of the street for the convenience of the homeowner and for other persons 
who desired to visit or enter the house for business or other lawful purpose).  
 81 NAACP v. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 484 (E.D.N.Y 2003).  
 82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. f (1979). 
 83 See supra Part I.  
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distribution practices at issue were unregulated for the most 
part.84 Consequently, the next question became whether the 
defendants’ actions were unreasonable and, if so, whether they 
contributed to the public nuisance created by the unlawful 
possession of handguns.85   
2.  Conduct of Defendants Created, Contributed to, or 
Maintained the Nuisance 
Even when a court finds substantial interference with a 
public right, the court will not hold the defendant liable unless 
the plaintiff can prove that the defendant -- either by conduct 
or omissions that were intentional, were negligent, or 
amounted to abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activity 
-- created, contributed to, or maintained a public nuisance.86 
The elements necessary to demonstrate negligence in a public 
nuisance action are similar, but not identical, to those required 
in all tort claims for negligence. A plaintiff must show duty, 
breach, and causation. However, on the question of causation, 
two differences exist in the analysis that courts use for public 
nuisance claims and traditional causation analysis. First, 
courts can hold defendants liable for conduct that creates a 
public nuisance in the aggregate.87 Second, the occurrence of 
multiple, or even criminal, intervening actions do not 
necessarily break the chain of causation in a public nuisance 
action as they likely would in a negligence action.88 Thus, a 
court may hold a defendant liable under public nuisance law 
whether his actions were the impetus for the public nuisance or 
merely a link in the chain of events giving rise to it. This 
altered (broader) definition of causation directly responds to 
the foreseeability argument that many handgun manufacturers 
make in response to litigation.89   
As Judge Weinstein explained in AcuSport, intent, for 
public nuisance purposes, is present in the context of handgun 
  
 84 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 485. 
 85 Id. at 485-86. 
 86 Copart, 362 N.E.2d at 971. The Restatement also links a finding of 
intentional or negligent interference with a public right to the unreasonableness of the 
interference. “If the interference with the public right is intentional, it must also be 
unreasonable. . . . If the interference was unintentional, the principles governing 
negligent or reckless conduct . . . all embody in some degree the concept of 
unreasonableness.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979). 
 87 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 493. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. at 494. 
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litigation when “a manufacturer, importer, or distributor of 
handguns knows or is substantially certain that its marketing 
practices have a significant impact on the likelihood that a gun 
will be diverted into the illegal market and used in crime, and 
that substantial harm to the public will result.”90 This 
definition of intent can deflate a handgun manufacturer or 
distributor’s argument that he should not be held responsible 
for the crimes committed with his handguns by third parties. 
So long as a plaintiff can prove with substantial certainty that 
handgun manufacturers and distributors were aware that such 
crimes would be committed because of the business practices in 
which they engaged, then the manufacturers and distributors 
may be found to have the requisite intent.     
3. Special Injury 
Generally, state or local government authorities will 
bring a cause of action to prosecute a public nuisance. 
However, a private citizen can also bring an action for public 
nuisance so long as he can show that the public nuisance 
caused him to suffer a special injury.91 Consequently, a private 
actor bringing an action for public nuisance bears a greater 
burden than does a government actor attempting to abate the 
same nuisance. In New York, courts apply a different-in-kind 
test, rather than a different-in-degree test, to assess whether a 
private plaintiff has satisfied the special injury element of the 
public nuisance tort.92  
Scholars have debated the necessity of requiring private 
plaintiffs to prove a harm different in kind to sustain an action 
for public nuisance. Some have suggested that courts should 
allow private plaintiffs to satisfy the special injury rule by 
proving that they have suffered a harm of a greater degree 
than the community at large as long as the harm suffered was 
substantial and pecuniary in nature.93 Alternatively, Professor 
Prosser has argued that courts should not discount degree 
  
 90 Id. at 488. 
 91 Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146 (N.Y. 1828) (adopting and applying the 
special injury rule in New York); AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 482.  
 92 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
 93 See Prosser, supra note 41, at 1008. See also Antolini, supra note 67, at 
793, in which the author argues that the sixteenth century anonymous case to which 
the development of the special injury rule is attributed seems to suggest a different-in-
degree test and not a different-in-kind test as Justice Fitzherbert used the term 
“greater” four times in his opinion and the term “more” three times in his opinion and 
nowhere used language suggesting that harm must be different in kind.   
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because one can find correlations between degree and kind 
when measuring harms. For example, a person who travels 
down an obstructed road once a day is unlikely to prevail in a 
private action for public nuisance because the harm he suffers 
does not differ in kind from that suffered by another individual 
who travels down the same road once a week. He could show 
“nothing more than that he travels a highway a great deal 
more frequently than anyone else,”94a fact that “does not 
establish particular damage from loss of its use.”95 However, if 
that person travels the same road a dozen times a day, “he 
always has some special reason to do so, and that reason will 
almost invariably be based upon some special interest of his 
own not common to the community. Substantial interference 
with that interest must be a particular damage.”96 This blurred 
distinction between a harm different-in-kind and a harm 
different-in-degree contributes to the confusion surrounding 
the special injury rule.     
Like many American courts, New York cites efficiency 
as justification for applying the special injury rule and the 
different-in-kind test.97 Many courts believe that the special 
injury limits the number of suits brought against a defendant 
who maintains a public nuisance.98 And courts find the 
different-in-kind test easier, and thus more efficient, to apply 
than the different-in-degree test. Courts think that 
distinguishing harms by degree is more subjective than 
distinguishing harms by kind.99 Consequently, when no 
member of a community suffers “greater hurt or inconvenience 
  
 94 Prosser, supra note 41, at 1010. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1011. In the 1815 case of Rose v. Miles, an English court allowed the 
plaintiff, who suffered a harm different in degree, to bring a public nuisance action 
against the defendant whose barge obstructed the plaintiff’s use of his barges for the 
sale of goods, wares, and merchandises, forcing the plaintiff to use a more expensive 
overland route for his business. While the harm suffered was not unique, as all others 
crossing the river had to use the same overland route, the court found it sufficiently 
satisfied the special injury rule because the plaintiff’s harm was “something different” 
given he was in the business of navigation. See Antolini, supra note 67, at 799.  
 97 See, e.g., 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 96 
N.Y.2d 280, 292 (2001) (“This principle [of the special injury rule] recognizes the 
necessity of guarding against the multiplicity of lawsuits that would follow if everyone 
were permitted to seek redress for a wrong common to the public.”). 
 98 Judge Weinstein noted that the different-in-kind test “cut[s] down 
potential suits by busybodies having no particular interest in abating the nuisance 
except ideology.” AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 498. 
 99 See id. at 449 (“Differences in degree do not suffice. There must be 
difference in ‘kind’ under New York Law.”). 
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than any other,”100 only a public actor may bring an action to 
abate a public nuisance. Should a state or municipality choose 
not to bring an action against the actor creating the nuisance, 
the nuisance will simply continue to cause harm to the 
community.    
Despite the Restatement’s description of the special 
injury rule as an unnecessary element of a private action for 
public nuisance when the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief,101 
New York, like most states,102 requires private plaintiffs to 
prove a special injury whether they seek damages or an 
injunction to abate a public nuisance.103 Why courts require a 
private plaintiff bringing an action for injunctive relief to prove 
a special injury remains unclear. The absence of any 
justification for the rule argues in favor of eliminating it in the 
context of equitable actions, as do the incongruous outcomes 
that the rule produces in litigation such as that brought 
against the handgun industry.  
III.  PRIOR LITIGATION AGAINST HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS 
The AcuSport case is unique in that it is the first case in 
which a New York court held that handgun manufacturers and 
distributors do contribute to the public nuisance created by the 
unlawful possession and use of handguns in New York. Two 
other cases brought in New York against the handgun industry 
  
 100 Prosser, supra note 41, at 1005. 
 101 “It has been the traditional rule that if a member of the public has not 
suffered damages different in kind and cannot maintain a tort action for damages, he 
also has no standing to maintain an action for an injunction. The reasons for this rule 
in the damage action are that it is to prevent the bringing of a multiplicity of actions by 
many members of the public and the bringing of actions for trivial injury. These 
reasons are much less applicable to a suit to enjoin the public nuisance.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. j (1979).  
 102 The following cases are examples of states that require private plaintiffs to 
demonstrate special injury regardless of the type of relief sought. See Harbor Beach 
Surf Club v. Water Taxi, 711 So. 2d 1230, 1236-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“Since 
Water Taxi cannot make [] a showing [of a special injury], it has no standing to seek 
injunctive relief concerning the bridge.”); Coticchia v. City of Bay Village, No. 73658, 
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3297, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 1998) (stating that “standing 
to maintain a private action for injunctive relief” depends on the plaintiff’s ability to 
allege a special injury”); Richmond Realty, Inc., et al. v. Town of Richmond, 644 A.2d 
831, 832 (R.I. 1994) (“In the absence of special injury an injunction will not lie for a 
public harm of the kind described in this case.”). 
 103 Graceland Corp. v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 180 N.Y.S.2d 644, 650 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1958) (Valente, J., dissenting) (“Under well-established rules, a plaintiff is 
not entitled to injunctive relief against unlawful use of the streets unless he has 
sustained a special injury. In the absence of such a showing, it is for the municipality 
to abate or enjoin any alleged nuisance.”).  
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influenced Judge Weinstein’s findings that while the NAACP 
failed to satisfy the special injury rule, it did satisfy the other 
elements of a public nuisance claim: the existence of a public 
nuisance and the defendants’ contribution to that nuisance. A 
discussion of these two cases, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek104 and 
People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,105 will enhance understanding of 
the AcuSport decision and this Note’s call for change to the 
special injury rule.     
A.  Hamilton v. Accu-Tek 
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek was brought in July 1995 in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York before Judge Weinstein. The plaintiffs were relatives of 
six individuals killed by handguns and one injured survivor of 
a handgun shooting and his mother.106 The plaintiffs claimed 
that the manufacturers’ negligent marketing and distribution 
practices directly supported an illegal underground market in 
handguns. They argued that this market furnished the 
weapons used in the shootings that precipitated their lawsuit 
and proximately caused the six deaths and one injury for which 
the plaintiffs sought damages.107 If for no other reason, 
Hamilton distinguished itself from other handgun litigation 
because it reached a jury. The jury’s verdict was the first of its 
kind.  
The jury found fifteen of the twenty-five defendants 
were negligent and found that nine of the defendants 
proximately caused the injuries suffered by one or more of the 
plaintiffs.108 However, the jury awarded damages only to the one 
plaintiff who had survived his shooting.109 Following the verdict 
for the plaintiffs, Judge Weinstein denied the defendants’ 
  
 104 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Hamilton III].  
 105 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
 106 Hamilton III, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. at 811. The case reached the jury after several pretrial motions by 
defendants to dismiss the case. Defendants first moved for summary judgment shortly 
after the case was brought in 1995. Judge Weinstein dismissed plaintiffs’ products 
liability claim and fraud claim but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on their negligent 
marketing theory. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
[hereinafter Hamilton I]. After the parties completed discovery, defendants brought 
another motion for summary judgment which was also denied by Judge Weinstein in 
1998. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, No. 95 Civ. 0049, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19703, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Hamilton II].  
 109 Hamilton III, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808. 
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motion to dismiss on the ground of collateral estoppel110 and 
their motion for judgment as a matter of law.111  
Much of the language Judge Weinstein used in 
upholding the jury’s verdict foreshadowed the conclusions he 
drew in AcuSport. Regarding the manufacturers and 
distributors’ responsibility for the crimes committed with their 
products, Judge Weinstein declared: “It cannot be said, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable steps could not have been taken 
by handgun manufacturers to reduce the risk of their products’ 
being sold to persons likely to misuse them.”112 Judge Weinstein 
concluded that handgun manufacturers and distributors have 
the ability to detect, and thus prevent, the risks associated 
with their products.113 This ability to detect and prevent risks 
imposes on manufacturers and distributors a special duty vis-
à-vis any individual foreseeably and potentially placed in 
harm’s way by the use of handguns.114 Although the Hamilton 
plaintiffs did not bring their case on a public nuisance theory, 
Judge Weinstein’s findings on negligence directly impacted his 
findings in AcuSport. To successfully bring a public nuisance 
action, the NAACP, like the plaintiffs in Hamilton, had to 
prove that manufacturers and distributors negligently created, 
contributed to, or maintained the public nuisance allegedly 
created by handguns.115   
Despite Judge Weinstein’s strong statement of the 
validity of the jury’s verdict in Hamilton, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed Judge Weinstein on appeal.116 To 
reach its decision, the Second Circuit certified what it described 
as two novel questions of state law to the New York Court of 
Appeals. The first question was whether the defendants owed 
the plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
marketing and distribution of the handguns they 
manufactured. The second question was whether liability could 
be apportioned by market share, and, if so, how.117 The Court of 
  
 110 Id. at 815. 
 111 Id. at 839. (“[T]here was sufficient evidence to persuade a rational jury 
that criminal misuse of handguns was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants’ 
negligent marketing and distribution practices . . . easy access to illegal guns increases 
gun violence and homicide.”). 
 112 Id. at 820. 
 113 Id. at 821. 
 114 Hamilton III, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 821. 
 115 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 116 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter 
Hamilton IV]. 
 117 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) 
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Appeals answered both questions in the negative, ultimately 
leading the Second Circuit to overturn the jury’s verdict.  
In spite of this outcome, the Court of Appeals notably 
remarked that the case had challenged the justices to rethink 
the traditional notions of duty, liability, and causation in the 
context of handgun litigation.118 The Court of Appeals did not 
reject the argument that handgun manufacturers could be 
found negligent for handgun crimes. Instead, the court noted 
that plaintiffs could possibly succeed in a negligence cause of 
action if they could prove that manufacturers supplied 
wholesalers knowing that they regularly trafficked guns into 
illegal markets.119 These findings left the door open to the 
possibility of a favorable outcome in the future for a plaintiff 
seeking to hold manufacturers and distributors liable on either 
a negligence theory or a public nuisance theory.        
B.  People of the State of New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 
et al.  
In June 2000, the Attorney General of the State of New 
York brought another significant case against handgun 
manufacturers and wholesalers in New York Supreme Court .120 
In Sturm, Ruger, proceeding on a theory of public nuisance, the 
Attorney General, a public plaintiff, brought an action for 
injunctive relief. Specifically, the State sought to abate the 
“alleged public nuisance arising from the manufacture and 
distribution of handguns that are unlawfully possessed and 
used in New York.”121 As a public plaintiff, the Attorney General 
did not have to allege a special injury. Rather, the Attorney 
General only needed to allege conduct by the defendants that 
created, contributed to, or maintained an interference with or 
injury to the public in the exercise of common rights.122 Despite 
the lesser burden that the Attorney General faced compared to 
a private plaintiff contending with the special injury rule, the 
State Supreme Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a cause of action.123 The court found that the 
  
[hereinafter Hamilton V]. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. at 1064. 
 120 NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 457-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 121 Id. at 458 (citing People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Index No. 402856/00 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001), aff’d, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 2003)).  
 122 People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 206 (App. Div. 2003). 
 123 Id. at 194. 
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State could not survive a motion to dismiss because it failed to 
sufficiently state specific facts showing how the defendants had 
contributed to the creation of the alleged public nuisance, 
illegally possessed handguns.124 The Appellate Division, First 
Department affirmed the decision on appeal.125    
Together, Accu-Tek and Sturm, Ruger set the stage for 
the AcuSport litigation. While the special injury rule did not 
lead to the demise of either case, both cases impacted Judge 
Weinstein’s findings in AcuSport. Each case influenced the 
AcuSport decision with regard to the other two elements of a 
public nuisance claim: the existence of a public nuisance 
created by an illegal market of handguns, and causation.    
IV.  NAACP V. ACUSPORT, INC.  
A.  Facts and Findings  
The NAACP initiated its action in the Eastern District 
of New York in July 1999 by filing a complaint against 
approximately 80 manufacturers and importers of firearms. 
The organization subsequently filed a second action against 50 
distributors of firearms in October 1999. The two actions were 
consolidated in May 2002.126 The NAACP used the following 
language to describe the public nuisance created by the 
handgun industry:  
[L]arge numbers of handguns are available to criminals, juveniles, 
and other people prohibited by law from possessing and using them 
in New York state; that their availability endangers the people of 
New York and interferes with their use of public space; that the 
defendants negligently and intentionally cause this nuisance 
although they were on notice . . . that this would be a consequence of 
their imprudent sales and distribution practices throughout the 
United States; and that defendants negligently and intentionally 
failed to take practicable marketing steps that would have avoided 
  
 124 Id. In the complaint, plaintiff had alleged that trace requests from the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) put the defendants on notice that 
certain guns manufactured and guns sold in certain locations were used 
disproportionately in the commission of crimes. Id. BATF conducts gun traces to 
determine the distribution history of a gun used in a crime or recovered by police. 
Plaintiff alleged that this information showed that defendants knowingly contributed 
to the number of guns in illegal markets through their manufacturing and distribution 
practices. Id. at 199. However, the court ultimately held that this information was not 
sufficient to demonstrate defendants’ contribution to the alleged public nuisance 
because defendants had limited access to this information. Id. at 200.  
 125 Id. at 194. 
 126 NAACP v. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 499 (E.D.N.Y 2003). 
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or alleviated the nuisance by substantially reducing the pool of 
illegally possessed handguns in New York and in states where 
handguns were obtained for illegal transport to [New York].127 
The NAACP sought to enjoin handgun manufacturers, 
distributors, and importers from engaging in these activities. 
In its complaint, the organization proposed various precautions 
that the defendants could take to avoid maintaining this public 
nuisance.128 For example, the NAACP argued that defendants 
should limit certain activities such as multiple retail sales of 
guns to the same person and unsupervised sales of new guns at 
gun shows.129 The organization also suggested that the 
defendants should cut off sales of new guns to retailers that sell 
a disproportionate number of handguns traced by the Bureau 
of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”), because traces 
usually indicate a connection between a gun and criminal 
activity.130 Finally, the NAACP argued that the defendants 
should train retailers to detect straw purchases.131 Although the 
NAACP brought this action as a private plaintiff, each of these 
proposed injunctions would result in fewer guns being diverted 
into illegal markets which would benefit the New York 
community at large and not just the members of the NAACP.  
In response to the NAACP’s allegations, the defendants 
individually and collectively contended that their manufacture 
and sale of handguns fully complied with all applicable federal 
and state laws.132 Furthermore, the defendants argued that they 
conducted their business responsibly and often went beyond 
the dictates of the law to ensure that their handguns did not 
end up in the hands of criminals.133 Most importantly, however, 
the defendants claimed that because gun crimes plague the 
New York community at large, the NAACP, a private plaintiff, 
could not prove that its members or potential members suffered 
  
 127 Id. at 446-47. 
 128 Id. at 447. 
 129 Id.  
 130 Id.  
 131 A straw purchase occurs when a person legally entitled to purchase a gun 
does so for a person who is not legally entitled. See AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 447. 
Other suggested precautions included “insisting that a retailer not operate under 
various names to avoid surveillance as an unusual source of traced guns; inspecting 
retail outlets to see that they are managed appropriately to avoid any overt connection 
to criminal elements; and taking other inexpensive and effective steps to stop their new 
guns from being diverted from the legal to the illegal market.” Id. 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id.  
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a harm different in kind from that suffered by the rest of the 
public.134 Ultimately, this argument led to dismissal.  
In reaching his decision to dismiss the case, Judge 
Weinstein relied, in part, on the findings of an advisory jury.135 
Judge Weinstein deemed an advisory jury particularly 
appropriate in an action such as AcuSport where “the issues at 
stake are of some public interest, and the relief requested could 
have a considerable effect on the New York public.”136 The 
advisory jury sat for six weeks and returned verdicts for each 
company listed on the verdict sheet. The jury found 45 of the 
defendants not liable and reached no verdict as to 23 
defendants.137 While Judge Weinstein relied on these findings in 
his decision to dismiss the case, he noted that advisory jury’s 
verdicts would not interfere with his role as the ultimate trier 
of fact.138  
Judge Weinstein’s own findings led to the case’s 
dismissal. He ultimately held that the NAACP’s claim failed 
because the organization could only prove two of the three 
elements necessary to prevail on a private claim of public 
nuisance. First, the NAACP had established the existence of a 
public nuisance in the form of the “criminal possession and use 
of handguns in New York [causing] many unnecessary deaths 
and much unnecessary injury.” 139 Next, Judge Weinstein 
determined that the NAACP satisfied the second element of the 
public nuisance test, establishing that the negligent or 
intentional conduct or omissions by the defendants created, 
contributed to, or maintained the public nuisance. The judge 
found that the defendants often acted carelessly in their 
marketing and distribution practices, which lacked appropriate 
precautions, resulting in a significant diversion of handguns 
from the legal market into an illegal market.140 In turn, this 
  
 134 Id. 
 135 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge sitting in an equitable 
action is both the trier of law and the trier of fact. AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
However, the judge may empanel an advisory jury to sit through a trial and render a 
verdict as if it were the ultimate trier of fact. Id. at 470-71. While the verdict is not 
binding, the judge considers the verdict when ruling on the case. Id. at 472. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 52(a).   
 136 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 499-500.  
 137 Id. at 500. 
 138 Id. at 469. 
 139 Id. at 449. 
 140 Id. at 450. 
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substantial market of illegally obtained handguns led to 
increased use of handguns in criminal activities.141   
Additionally, Judge Weinstein concluded that 
manufacturers and distributors could significantly reduce the 
flow of handguns into the illegal markets by taking some 
“obvious and easily implemented steps” to increase the 
responsibility of the retailers with whom they contract.142 
Suggested by the plaintiff, these steps included “requiring 
retailers to avoid multiple or repeat sales to the same 
customers.”143 Judge Weinstein reasoned that the handgun 
industry could readily institute such a practice by contract with 
its retailers.144 Thus, Judge Weinstein had little trouble 
identifying the defendants’ contribution to the public nuisance 
that illegally obtained handguns created in New York.   
Despite these positive findings, the NAACP’s case 
ultimately failed on the third element of the public nuisance 
test, the special injury rule. The NAACP did successfully prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that its members suffered a 
variety of harms. These harms ranged from a fear of gun 
violence preventing NAACP members from attending meetings 
to a host of violent crimes committed against NAACP members 
with illegally obtained handguns.145 Nonetheless, these findings 
could not sufficiently sustain a cause of action because “[t]here 
was no proof that men and women were afraid because of 
handguns to go out at night only to attend NAACP meetings.”146 
Instead, to the NAACP’s detriment, Judge Weinstein concluded 
that “[a]ll population groups in New York are potential 
homicide victims from illegal handguns in New York.”147  
Although Judge Weinstein did find that the NAACP and 
its members suffered “greater adverse effects”148 from the public 
nuisance created by the defendants than did other members of 
the community, harms of a greater degree do not satisfy the 
special injury rule. The NAACP failed to prove that the harm it 
suffered from the public nuisance was different in kind from 
that suffered by other persons in New York.149 “Ironically,” 
  
 141 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 449. 
 145 Id. at 508. 
 146 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Id. at 451. 
 149 Id.  
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Judge Weinstein observed, “the demonstration that all New 
Yorkers would gain from [the proposed] method[s] of reducing a 
dangerous public nuisance prevents the NAACP from obtaining 
relief under New York law on the ground that it suffers a 
special kind of harm from irresponsible handgun marketing.”150 
This conclusion highlights the problems with public nuisance 
law’s application of the special injury rule in equitable actions. 
More often than not, as in AcuSport, the special injury rule 
defeats rather than furthers the purpose of the public nuisance 
law: protecting the public at large.      
B.  Distinguishing AcuSport from Hamilton and Sturm, 
Ruger 
Much of the significance of the AcuSport decision lies in 
Judge Weinstein’s findings on the second factor of the public 
nuisance test: that the manufacturers and distributors had 
contributed to a public nuisance, the illegal market of 
handguns in New York. This finding distinguished AcuSport 
from Hamilton and Sturm, Ruger. In those cases, both the 
Second Circuit and the Appellate Division of New York found 
that the plaintiffs could not prove the defendants had created, 
contributed to, or maintained the alleged public nuisance, the 
same illegal gun market complained of in AcuSport.151 This 
finding of causation has a tremendous impact on the future of 
handgun litigation brought on a theory of public nuisance. 
Now, only the special injury rule potentially stands in the way 
of a private plaintiff bringing a successful public nuisance 
claim against the handgun industry.  
The plaintiffs in Sturm, Ruger and AcuSport brought 
their cases on a theory of public nuisance. Although Sturm, 
Ruger, like AcuSport, was dismissed, Judge Weinstein 
distinguished the cases in several ways. Most significantly, he 
compared findings on the second element of the public nuisance 
test. Judge Weinstein discussed, at some length, the timing of 
the Sturm, Ruger case and the evidence available to the 
Attorney General when he brought the case.152  
The Attorney General of New York brought Sturm, 
Ruger in New York Supreme Court in June 2000, almost one 
  
 150 Id.  
 151 Sturm, Ruger, & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d at 201; Hamilton V, 750 N.E.2d at 
1059. 
 152 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d. at 458. 
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year after the NAACP filed AcuSport in the Eastern District 
but three years before Judge Weinstein issued his opinion.153 As 
far as the New York Supreme Court knew, the only evidence 
that would have been available to the Attorney General in 
connection with the second element of the public nuisance 
claim, that the defendants had contributed to a public nuisance 
through negligent marketing and distribution, was the same 
BATF trace evidence presented to the court by the plaintiffs in 
Hamilton I.154 Since that evidence failed to withstand appeal in 
Hamilton I, the Supreme Court reasoned that the same 
evidence could not sufficiently support a claim of public 
nuisance in Sturm, Ruger. In reaching its decision, the 
Appellate Division assumed that the level of knowledge flowing 
from the instant trace requests at the time Sturm, Ruger was 
brought was no greater than it was when Hamilton I was 
decided.155 Therefore, despite the fact of a public nuisance 
created by the unlawful possession of handguns in New York, 
the State did not have sufficient evidence to prevail on the 
element of causation.   
However, Judge Weinstein viewed this conclusion as 
rash on the part of the Appellate Division. He criticized the 
court for failing to take into account the fact that, as a part of 
the federal discovery practice in the AcuSport case, much more 
extensive and more recent data from the BATF database was 
released to the parties than was available during Hamilton I or 
any prior litigation against the handgun industry.156  
Judge Weinstein’s findings have significant implications 
for the most recent lawsuit brought in New York against the 
handgun industry. In June 2000, the City of New York brought 
a public nuisance claim against the handgun industry in the 
Eastern District of New York.157 In an opinion denying the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Weinstein remarked that 
new BATF data that helped the NAACP satisfy the causation 
element of its public nuisance claim in AcuSport would likewise 
allow the City to satisfy that element in contesting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. This decision suggests that the 
City has a significant chance of succeeding in its lawsuit, 
especially since, as a public actor, the City need not satisfy the 
  
 153 Id. at 457-58. See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 154 Id. at 458. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 458-59. 
 157 City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (2004). 
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special injury element of the tort. The City seeks no damages 
against the handgun industry, only injunctive relief that would 
require the handgun industry to implement “a variety of 
prudent marketing practices to help prevent defendants' guns 
from diversion into illegal markets.”158 The relief which the City 
seeks – and which it has a better chance of winning than any 
other plaintiff who has brought a public nuisance action 
against the handgun industry – highlights the inefficiency of 
the special injury rule for those private plaintiffs who bring 
equitable public nuisance claims. The injunctive relief that the 
City of New York seeks mirrors that which the NAACP sought 
in its lawsuit. Without the special injury rule to contend with, 
the NAACP may have won the injunctive relief it sought, 
abated the public nuisance created by the handgun industry, 
and thereby eliminated the need for the City of New York to 
continue to pour time and money into its current handgun 
litigation.   
V.  ANALYSIS: ELIMINATING THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE FOR 
PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
The outcome of AcuSport argues persuasively for the 
elimination of the special injury rule for those private plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief from a public nuisance. While the 
decision left the door open for the State of New York to bring 
another public nuisance action against the handgun industry, 
there is no guarantee that the State will do so as such litigation 
is expensive and time-consuming. Consequently, so long as the 
courts continue their strict application of the special injury 
rule, the public will remain vulnerable to the pervasive and 
dangerous nuisance created by the illegal handgun market. 
Both the history of the special injury rule and the nature of 
injunctive relief argue in favor of the courts abandoning their 
adherence to the special injury rule in cases of private action 
for public nuisance.      
An early New York court observed that damages 
awarded to a plaintiff absent a special injury would distort the 
purpose of the public nuisance laws because they would “[give] 
every man a separate right of action for what damnifies him in 
common only with the rest of his fellow-citizens.”159 However, 
this fear of a multiplicity of lawsuits flooding courts in the 
  
 158 Id. at 263. 
 159 Doolittle v. Superiors of Broome County, 18 N.Y. 155, 160 (1858). 
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absence of a special injury rule should not penetrate equitable 
suits. Were courts to abandon completely their use of the 
special injury rule, they may indeed face an infinite number of 
private plaintiffs seeking damages as relief from a public 
nuisance. But when one plaintiff receives damages for the 
harm he suffered, those damages offer no relief for the harm 
that his neighbor suffers in the face of the same public 
nuisance. Consequently, that neighbor must bring his own 
separate suit for damages to remedy his harms. Thus, courts 
clearly need some toll with which they can manage the number 
of private plaintiffs seeking damages as relief from a public 
nuisance. On the other hand, injunctive relief is a management 
tool in itself. In eliminating a public nuisance, an injunction 
would simultaneously eliminate the need for future litigation. 
Whether sought by a private or public plaintiff, injunctive relief 
protects all citizens by eliminating the nuisance unreasonably 
interfering with their shared rights and interests.  
A.  The Application of Public Nuisance Law to Handgun 
Litigation 
Abandoning the special injury rule in cases where 
private plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to abate a public 
nuisance could better protect the interests, health, and safety 
of the public – as the law was designed to do – without opening 
the floodgates of frivolous litigation. Despite the disappointing 
outcome of the AcuSport case – in which but for the court’s use 
of the special injury rule the NAACP would have had a viable 
claim for public nuisance against the handgun industry160 – the 
tort of public nuisance offers an effective means of regulating 
the sale of handguns in the United States. While Judge 
Weinstein’s AcuSport opinion was unique in its findings that 
the handgun industry has contributed to the public nuisance 
caused by unlawfully possessed handguns,161 its uniqueness 
should not militate against the suitability of public nuisance 
claims against the handgun industry. One of the benefits of the 
common law is that it “is not static.”162 Notwithstanding the 
  
 160 See supra Part IV.B. 
 161 See supra Part IV.B (explaining that new BATF data relied on by the 
plaintiffs in AcuSport led Judge Weinstein to find proof of the gun industry’s 
contribution to a public nuisance that had been absent in prior cases).  
 162 State v. Schenectady Chems, Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1983). 
The court goes on to observe that “[s]ociety has repeatedly been confronted with new 
inventions and products that, through foreseen and unforeseen events, have imposed 
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handgun industry’s arguments to the contrary,163 scholars 
support the use of public nuisance laws as effective means of 
controlling the devastating effects of handgun violence in the 
United States. 164  
Throughout its existence, public nuisance law has 
expanded its reach beyond those evils it was first developed to 
combat. While early English courts may not have foreseen 
public nuisance laws being used to abate the plague of 
handgun violence, the fact that it has survived the virtual 
demise of many of the nuisances it was developed to abate – 
such as horses falling into ditches – evinces the law’s 
adaptability.165  
In the context of the illegal handgun market, the 
adaptability of public nuisance laws put them at an advantage 
over specific state and federal regulations of the handgun 
industry. The legislative process is slow, and state statutes or 
local regulations are “limited in their ability to adjust to 
changed conditions.”166 Conversely, the common law of public 
nuisance can readily combat problems that may unexpectedly 
plague our society. As the outcome of AcuSport evidences, the 
special injury rule severely limits the adaptability of public 
nuisance law. Clearly, the illegal handgun market constitutes a 
public nuisance as it compromises all of the public rights listed 
in the Restatement: the public health, the public safety, the 
public peace, the public comfort, and the public convenience.167 
So long as courts continue to strictly apply the special injury 
  
dangers upon society,” and “courts have reacted by expanding the common law to meet 
the challenge.” Id. 
 163 See John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for 
Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and 
Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 289 (2001) (stating that both the handgun industry 
and anti-gun control organizations believe litigation against the gun industry to be an 
attempt to “achiev[e] through litigation what cannot be achieved through the 
legislative route” thereby circumventing the “democratic process”).  
 164 See id. at 290 (“[P]ublic nuisance law is the best fit for municipal 
complaints against gun sellers.”); Lytton, supra note 28, at 5 (“Tort liability can 
complement legislative regulation, providing gun sellers and manufacturers with 
incentives to take reasonable measures to prevent gun sales to criminals, instead of 
looking for legal ways to increase them.”). 
 165 See Larsen, supra note 37, at 42 (“As society’s values shift such as from 
promoting a strong national defense to environmental cleanliness, formerly accepted 
practices which damage goals important to present-day society will more likely become 
prohibited as public nuisances.”).  
 166 Id. at 38. The author continues, “common law public nuisance law provides 
the desired remedy of abatement, without the quagmire of legislation or the 
obsolescence of static regulations.” Id. at 38-39.  
 167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1979).  
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rule, public nuisance law will, like existing statutory 
regulations of the handgun industry, remain limited in its 
ability to effectively abate this nuisance. 
While the outcome of the AcuSport case does leave the 
door open for a public authority to bring a public nuisance 
action against handgun makers,168 the inefficiency of this 
outcome cannot be overlooked. The State of New York may not 
have needed to bring its own action had the special injury rule 
not prematurely ended the NAACP’s quest for injunctive relief. 
Whether sought by a private or a public plaintiff, injunctive 
relief has been suggested to be the most effective way to protect 
the interests of the public threatened by a public nuisance.169 
Because injunctive relief benefits the community at large, as 
opposed to damages which only benefit the plaintiff in a private 
suit for public nuisance, it follows that limiting a private 
plaintiff’s access to injunctive relief in claims for public 
nuisance hurts not only the plaintiff, but also the entire 
community. This outcome is illogical, as public nuisance law 
distinguishes itself from private nuisance law by extending 
protection to the community at large.170 Scholars have noted 
that eliminating the special injury rule for private plaintiffs to 
seek injunctive relief from a public nuisance may actually be a 
boon to a city or state that either lacks the resources to initiate 
such litigation on behalf of its citizens or simply chooses not 
to.171  
The unsettling effect of the special injury rule is that 
the more members of a community who are harmed by a public 
  
 168 See supra Part IV.B.  
 169 See Culhane, supra note 163, at 323 (“Inasmuch as the purpose of public 
nuisance law is to safeguard the public health and safety, the equitable remedies of 
injunction and abatement commend themselves as the most appropriate. Traditionally, 
in order to stanch the problem at its source, the public plaintiff has sought just such 
remedies.”).   
 170 See Conrad G. Touhey & Ferdinand V. Gonzalez, Emotional Distress Issues 
Raised by the Release of Toxic and Other Hazardous Materials, 41 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 661, 714 (2001) (“The greater the catastrophe, the greater immunity the 
tortfeasor may obtain. This is not a logical interpretation or application of the law or 
any societal goal, nor is it sound public policy. Under the statutory definition of 
nuisance, a public nuisance is distinguished from a private nuisance where an ‘entire 
community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons’ are affected.”).  
 171 See Panoff, supra note 52, at 712-13 (“[P]rivate actions complement those 
actions brought by public officials. Public officials often lack the resources to bring an 
action for public nuisance. Also inertia, political pressures, or vested interest in 
nuisance frequently inhibit many political officials. Accordingly, they cannot always be 
relied upon to seek adequate redress for a community.”); see also Culhane, supra note 
163, at 324 (noting that most municipalities bringing suits against gun manufacturers 
have focused on damages rather than injunctive relief).  
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nuisance, the more difficult it is for them to seek relief from 
those harms.172 Under the special injury rule, the private party 
best suited to bring an action for public nuisance is the one who 
is least representative of the community whose rights have 
been compromised. Eliminating the special injury rule in public 
nuisance claims for injunctive relief would do away with many 
of the paradoxical outcomes that the law currently produces.  
B.  Historical Support for a Modern Change to the Special 
Injury Rule 
Reasons for altering the special injury rule stem back to 
its 1536 origin. Chief Justice Baldwin’s fear that “if one person 
shall have an action for this, by the same reason every person 
shall have an action, and so [the defendant] will be punished a 
hundred times [over] on the same case,”173 led Justice 
Fitzherbert to suggest that private plaintiffs should show some 
“special hurt” when bringing an action for public nuisance. 174 
But English courts following the precedent of Anonymous did 
not conceive of the different-in-kind formulation of the special 
injury rule as the proper interpretation of Justice Fitzherbert’s 
special hurt requirement.  
One scholar attributes the development of the different-
in-kind test to a series of railroad compensation cases brought 
in the courts of England in the late 1800s.175 Acts of Parliament 
allowed private plaintiffs to seek compensation when railroad 
expansions encroached on their property so long as the 
  
 172 See NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“Ironically, the demonstration that all New Yorkers would gain from this method of 
reducing a dangerous public nuisance prevents the NAACP from obtaining relief under 
New York law on the grounds that it suffers a special kind of harm from irresponsible 
handgun marketing.”). 
 173 Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 26, pl. 10 (1536). 
 174 In the 1681 case of Hart v. Basset, a private plaintiff in England brought 
suit against the defendant for obstructing the way to plaintiff’s barn by placing a ditch 
and a gate in a public road. The court did not require the plaintiff to show a different 
kind of injury from that suffered by the community at large and rejected the 
defendant’s multiplicity argument. The court held that it was sufficient for the plaintiff 
to claim that the ditch and gate caused him a greater inconvenience than they caused 
to the community at large. Similarly, in the 1738 case of Chichester v. Lethbridge, the 
plaintiff’s carriages were blocked by defendant’s obstruction of a highway. Unlike the 
public at large, the plaintiff traveled the particular road several times a day, and the 
court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently shown a special injury because his 
harm was greater in degree than the harm suffered by the public. Antolini, supra note 
67, at 797.  
 175 Antolini, supra note 67, at 800.  
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plaintiffs could demonstrate an injury different in kind.176 The 
test was later ascribed to the special injury element of a private 
claim for public nuisance even though courts interpreting 
Justice Fitzherbert’s opinion had been using a different-in-
degree test. 177 The ease of applying a different-in-kind test 
apparently accounts for the English courts’ importation of the 
test into private actions for public nuisances.178 While courts 
must often adopt tools of judicial management at a cost to 
potential plaintiffs, the cost borne by those suffering harms 
from nuisances as serious as unlawfully possessed handguns 
seems too excessive and in need of curtailing.    
Without question, the special injury rule limits the 
number of private claims brought for public nuisance. 
However, the confusion that surrounded the special injury rule 
after its development in England179 and adoption in the United 
States,180 supports the argument that the rule is not the most 
effective way to preclude excessive numbers of private actions. 
Indeed, several American jurisdictions have already reached 
this conclusion and have begun to modify the special injury 
rule.181 These jurisdictions have recognized that the special 
injury rule often leads to results that undermine the purpose of 
public nuisance law: “safeguard[ing] the public health and 
safety.”182  
  
 176 Id. at 800-01.  
 177 Id. The author argues that the different-in-degree test was applied by the 
courts of England until the late 1800s and that the different-in-kind test was 
formulated in railroad compensation cases that did not involve public nuisance laws 
but rather acts of Parliament allowing:  
[C]ompensation for legislatively-authorized railroad companies’ expansion 
projects that “injuriously affected” private lands. The litigants and the House 
of Lords looked to the injury rule in public nuisance to guide their 
determination of compensable injuries under the acts. Even though the Lords 
acknowledged that the rule of public nuisance was a different-in-degree test, 
the more conservative different-in-kind rule that emerged from these railroad 
cases ultimately bounced back into public nuisance law and, ironically, 
became the foundation for the modern different-in-kind test.  
Id. 
 178 See supra note 51.  
 179 See supra note 51.  
 180 See supra Part II.B. 
 181 See infra Part V.C.  
 182 Culhane & Eggen, supra note 163, at 323. The authors juxtapose two cases 
in which the application of the special injury rule led to conflicting results. In Anderson 
v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232-34 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1986), leukemia 
victims, whose illness stemmed from groundwater pollution caused by defendants, 
were held to have stated a claim for public nuisance. However, in Venuto v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Ct. App. 1971), the court dismissed a 
claim for public nuisance brought by plaintiffs suffering respiratory problems because 
those problems affected all town residents. Culhane & Eggen, supra note 163, at 311.   
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C.  Modern Changes to the Special Injury Rule 
Responding to the often inequitable results that the 
special injury rule can produce, some jurisdictions have altered 
their application of the rule, specifically by eliminating the 
different-in-kind test. One example is the Burgess v. M/V 
Tamano case, which was brought as a class action suit in 
federal district court in Maine in 1973.183 The plaintiffs, 
commercial fishermen and clam diggers, sought to recover 
damages for losses they incurred after an oil tanker, defendant 
M/V Tamano, discharged 100,000 gallons of oil into the waters 
of the Cosco Bay. For their livelihood, the plaintiffs fished and 
harvested for clams in the Cosco Bay.184 The plaintiffs brought 
their claim on a theory of public nuisance alleging “loss of 
profits and impairment of earning capacity.”185 The defendants 
moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the plaintiffs’ damages 
were not different in kind from those sustained by members of 
the community at large.186 The court denied the motion.187  
First declaring the right to fish and harvest clams in 
Maine’s coastal waters a “public right[] . . . held by the State of 
Maine in trust for the common benefit of all of the people,”188 
the court went on to discuss the role the special injury rule 
should play when that right is infringed. The court observed 
that absent a special injury,189 a private plaintiff had no 
standing to bring a public nuisance action. In this case, the 
plaintiffs had not suffered damages different in kind from the 
general public. Nevertheless, the court held that:  
It would be an incongruous result . . . to say that a man engaged in 
commercial fishing or clamming, and dependent thereon for his 
livelihood, who may have had his business destroyed by the tortious 
act of another, should be denied any right to recover for his 
  
 183 Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973).  
 184 Id. at 248. 
 185 Id. at 249. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id. The court did, however, grant the motion with regard to claims brought 
by a third plaintiff class, owners of motels, trailer parks, camp grounds, restaurants, 
grocery stores, and similar establishments whose businesses depended on tourist trade, 
with the exception of those owning shore property injured by the spill. These plaintiffs 
asserted no “interference with their direct exercise of a public right” and could show no 
“distinct harm” from the oil spill. Id. at 251.  
 188 Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250. 
 189 Id.  
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pecuniary loss on the ground that his injury is no different in kind 
from that sustained by the general public.190  
The court gave no heed to the traditional justification for the 
special injury rule (the fear of a multiplicity of frivolous 
lawsuits) in rendering its decision, perhaps underscoring the 
frailty of that argument. The court’s alteration of the scope of 
the special injury rule has since been adopted by other 
jurisdictions. 191   
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has also altered its 
treatment of the special injury rule. In 1982, the court decided 
Akau v. Olohana Corp.,192 another class action suit in which the 
plaintiffs sought to enforce alleged rights-of-way along once-
public trails to the beach that crossed defendants’ property.193 
The court identified two subclasses of plaintiffs, each of which 
had lived or fished near the beach.194 The lower court had 
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, rejecting defendants' argument that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing because their injury did not differ in kind from that 
sustained by the general public.195  
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
and held that: 
A member of the public has standing to sue to enforce the rights of 
the public even though his injury is not different in kind from the 
public’s generally, if he can show that he has suffered an injury in 
fact, and that the concerns of a multiplicity of suits are satisfied by 
any means, including a class action.196  
The court found that the plaintiffs had suffered an 
injury in fact, because not having access to the public rights-of-
way impaired and in some instances prevented their use of the 
  
 190 Id.  
 191 See Golnay Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 841 F. Supp. 783, 785 (S.D. Tex. 
1993); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (E.D. La. 
1981). In both cases the courts allowed commercial fishermen to bring claims for public 
nuisance after oil-spills caused environmental damage to waterways even though the 
plaintiffs could not show damages different in kind. See also In re Starlink Corn 
Products Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that 
commercial farmers had standing to bring a public nuisance claim against seed 
companies that disseminated genetically modified corn that contaminated the entire 
United States’ corn supply because the commercial corn farmers were affected 
differently than the general public since they relied on the integrity of the corn crops 
for their livelihood).  
 192 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982). 
 193 Id. at 1132. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 1132-33. 
 196 Id. at 1134.  
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beach.197 Moreover, the court found that while its ruling had 
expanded the standing for public nuisance, the other elements 
of the claim would prevent the multiplicity of frivolous claims 
feared by courts in absence of the traditional special injury 
rule. In this case the court noted that a proper class action 
would reduce such a risk.198 The court rightly observed that 
injustice results when members of the public are denied “the 
ability to enforce the public’s rights when they are injured…. 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right 
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”199  
The practice of limiting public nuisance claims – absent 
a special injury – to public authorities was more appropriate at 
the time of the law’s development than it is today. During the 
time of the early English common law, “a harm to the public 
order, decency, or morals was considered a crime against the 
king.”200 Therefore, it followed that only the king could bring an 
action against the perpetrator.201 Today, however, a harm to the 
public order, decency or morals is a harm to the public, which, 
as the Akau court noted, should have access to the courts to 
redress the harm. Modern public nuisance laws should reflect 
these changes.202 By reconfiguring the special injury rule, the 
Burgess and Akau courts have allowed public nuisance law the 
flexibility to encompass the shape and scope of modern society.   
D.  Other Protections Against Frivolous Litigation 
The multiplicity of frivolous litigation, cited as the 
rationale for the special injury rule, does not threaten courts 
when plaintiffs seek injunctions; this threat only emerges when 
plaintiffs seek damages.203 Public nuisance laws protect rights 
  
 197 Akau, 652 P.2d at 1135. 
 198 Id. at 1134. (“Another reason for allowing liberal standing is that the 
danger of a multiplicity of suits is greatly alleviated by a proper class action.”).  
 199 Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 102 (1803)).  
 200 Id. at 1133.  
 201 See Gifford, supra note 54, at 819 (“History demonstrates that the core 
purpose underlying public nuisance has been to assure that public authorities have a 
legal remedy available to terminate conduct of a defendant that is violating a public 
right and injuring the public safety, health or welfare.”). 
 202 Akau, 652 P.2d at 1133-34 (noting other areas of the law in which courts 
have moved away from focusing on whether an injury is shared by the public, such as 
taxpayer suits and actions challenging administrative decisions).  
 203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. j (1979) (arguing that 
the reasons for maintaining a special injury rule are “much less applicable to a suit to 
enjoin the public nuisance”). See also Tim E. Sleeth, Public Nuisance: Standing to Sue 
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common to all. A private plaintiff who brings a suit for 
damages does not necessarily look to protect a right shared by 
him and his community as much as he looks to protect his own 
interests by recovering for losses that he alone has suffered. 
Paying damages – whether they are paid to a private or public 
plaintiff 204– may have some deterrent effect on a defendant 
responsible for a public nuisance. When a private plaintiff 
seeks damages for a minor injury caused by a public nuisance, 
however, such damages will likely do little to abate the public 
nuisance and, therefore, will leave the courts subject to further 
suits.205 Therefore, although the special injury rule may be 
unduly strict when applied to private actions for damages, it 
does serve a necessary screening function. On the other hand, 
once an injunction abates a public nuisance, the nuisance 
ceases to cause further damages to potential plaintiffs, 
eliminating the courts' need to stringently screen equitable 
actions. Furthermore, restricting private actions for damages 
makes sense since, unlike equitable actions, they do not further 
the purpose of public nuisance law by protecting interests 
shared by community members.     
In the absence of the special injury rule, proper 
application of the procedural elements surrounding public 
nuisance claims will help to eliminate potentially frivolous 
lawsuits by private plaintiffs requesting injunctive relief 
absent a special injury rule. First, in New York, a plaintiff 
bringing an action for injunctive relief from an alleged public 
nuisance must contend with a higher burden of proof than a 
plaintiff seeking damages. A plaintiff seeking an injunction 
must prove each element of a public nuisance claim by clear 
  
without Showing “Special Injury”, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 360, 366 (1973-74) (“Even where 
an actual injury was recognized or the action was for abatement or injunction and the 
multiplicity factor could not be relevant, the courts unhesitatingly followed the 
established rules and refused to grant redress or relief.”); Antolini, supra note 67, at 
889 (“The concern about burdensome multiplicity is applicable primarily, if not 
exclusively, to damages suits, where the likelihood of duplicative litigation would 
depend, in part, on the extent of the injury and the size of the initial award.”).  
 204 Courts agree that costs incurred by a municipality in the face of a public 
nuisance are compensable with damages. See City of Flagstaff v. Atchinson, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Recovery [of damages] has also 
been allowed where the acts of a private party create a public nuisance which the 
government seeks to abate.”); United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 
18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (“Recent federal court decisions reflect a growing recognition of 
suits by government agencies under federal common law for the abatement of public 
nuisances.”). 
 205 See Culhane & Eggen, supra note 163, at 327 (“Indeed, even if the 
defendants were to assume all costs, the nuisance could continue.”). 
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and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the standard that typically applies in civil litigation.206 
Judge Weinstein noted that this higher burden is appropriate 
in equitable actions because “the interests at stake are deemed 
more significant than ordinary.”207 Injunctive relief places a 
burden not only on defendants, but also on courts, which bear 
the responsibility of monitoring a defendant's compliance.208 
Unlike the special injury rule, the clear and convincing 
standard can deter frivolous litigation without simultaneously 
undercutting the purpose of public nuisance law protecting the 
public at large.209  
Furthermore, as the Akau court suggested, the 
procedural requirements of a class action can preclude 
excessive litigation absent the special injury rule.210 Class 
actions lend themselves well to public nuisance suits. Every 
member of a community is a potential plaintiff since, by 
definition of a public nuisance, each is harmed or potentially 
harmed by the existence of a public nuisance.211 Moreover, class 
actions ensure finality because “a judgment in a class action 
consisting of the people actually injured will bind the members 
who are all those allowed to sue.”212 Similarly, the procedural 
bar of res judicata can also prevent multiple or trivial 
litigations in the context of public nuisance cases as it does in 
all areas of litigation.213    
  
 206 NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Many 
of the cases in which plaintiffs have been required to prove a claim for public nuisance 
by clear evidence involve applications for injunctive relief.”). 
 207 Id. at 479 (citing New York Pattern Jury Instruction 1:64 cmt., at 85). See 
also California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1982), 
in which the Supreme Court held that California state law could require the 
application of a beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof, usually reserved for 
criminal cases, when a plaintiff brings a public nuisance action for obscenity because of 
the freedom of speech interests at stake in such actions.  
 208 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
 209 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.  
 210 Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982) (“Another reason 
for allowing liberal standing is that the danger of a multiplicity of suits is greatly 
alleviated by a proper class.”). See also Panoff, supra note 52, at 711 (“Multiplicity of 
suits can be discouraged by general requirements of standing in addition to the 
procedural mechanisms of class actions.”).  
 211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. j (1979) (noting “a 
distinction between an individual suit for damages and a suit in behalf of the public or 
a class action”). 
 212 Akau, 652 P.2d at 1134. 
 213 Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 281 So. 2d 572, 575 (Fla. 
App. 1973) (“[T]he increasing number of well-tried class actions tend to further limit 
litigation because of the principles which inhere within the doctrine of res judicata.”). 
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In addition to these procedural bars to excessive 
litigation, there are the practical bars imposed by the nature of 
our modern legal system. Most notably, the monetary burdens 
associated with any litigation will likely prevent those 
plaintiffs who have suffered minor damages from a public 
nuisance from bringing an action for injunctive relief. 214 Given 
the expense and time involved in bringing a lawsuit, a plaintiff 
such as the NAACP is more likely to bring an action to enjoin a 
public nuisance than an individual private citizen. The 
NAACP, a nationally renowned organization, has substantial 
monetary and legal resources at its dispense, making the 
undertaking of such complex litigation more feasible for the 
organization than it would be for the majority of private 
citizens. Finally, the remedy itself, injunctive relief, would 
simply dispense with much of the need for further private 
actions. Once a private plaintiff enjoins a public nuisance, that 
nuisance ceases to cause further damages that could give rise 
to additional litigation.  
Given these additional protections against frivolous 
lawsuits, the effects of the special injury rule are simply 
overbroad in the context of private actions for injunctive relief. 
And the bar to litigation imposed by application of the special 
injury rule is unnecessary in the face of the other procedural 
and practical bars to excessive private actions for public 
nuisance.   
CONCLUSION 
As illustrated by the unsatisfactory outcome of the 
AcuSport case, the special injury rule unnecessarily hinders 
the modern evolution of public nuisance law. While the special 
injury rule has a long history dating back to the sixteenth 
century, Oliver Wendell Holmes once rightly observed that "[i]t 
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
  
 214 Antolini, supra note 67, at 809 (arguing that a multiplicity of lawsuits 
would never arise in the absence of a special injury rule “because of the practical 
impediments to plaintiffs bringing such cases, including the rules on costs, which 
‘generally fall short of making the plaintiff whole,’ the necessity to pay for counsel, the 
out-of-pocket costs, the reluctance of lawyers to sue when damages are small, and the 
risk of monetary loss even with a win on the merits”). 
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imitation of the past.”215 The threat of excessive and trivial 
lawsuits that spurred the development of the special injury 
rule is not present in cases in which private plaintiffs seek 
injunctive relief to abate a public nuisance, a relief that would 
benefit an entire community and, in itself, thwart the risk of 
excessive litigation.   
As demonstrated by the outcome of AcuSport, barring 
access to injunctive relief via the special injury rule may in fact 
result in additional litigation. This pays a disservice to both the 
public who look to the law for protection, and the courts who 
look to the rule to decrease the number of lawsuits arising from 
a given nuisance. The injustice of the incongruous results that 
the special injury rule can produce becomes clear in the face of 
cases such as AcuSport. But for the AcuSport court’s adherence 
to the special injury rule, the NAACP may have won its 
injunction against the handgun industry, making the State of 
New York safer not only for NAACP members but for all 
citizens. As other procedural and practical elements of our legal 
system can sufficiently siphon the trivial actions thought to go 
hand in hand with a private action for public nuisance, the 
special injury rule no longer serves the same practical or 
doctrinal purposes it may have once served. States such as 
New York should follow the lead of other jurisdictions that 
have already altered their applications of the special injury 
rule and abandon this element of the public nuisance tort for 
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